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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Can we measure the quality of a judge’s past performance? Should 
the President weigh this factor in making Supreme Court appoint-
ments?1 I will argue that the answer to both questions is the same: 
“Yes, but with significant qualifications.” Yes, we do have some indi-
ces for assessing judicial performance—but those measures are rough 
and incomplete. Yes, the President should consider past judicial per-
formance and its objective indicators—but only to a limited degree. 
 These comments are prompted by two important recent articles by 
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati.2 They make a more ambitious claim: 
that we can measure judicial quality well enough to make it the pre-
dominant element in Supreme Court appointments. In their initial 
article, they proposed a tournament, an objective contest among fed-
eral appellate judges in which the prize is a Supreme Court ap-
pointment.3 In their follow-up article, they run an initial tournament 
using recent data about federal appellate decisions.4 They hedge 
their conclusions about “who is the fairest in the land,” but the clear 
                                                                                                                     
 * Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. 
 1. In my view, the Senate is probably entitled to consider the same factors as the 
President in determining whether the nomination is suitable. But the role of the Senate in 
judicial confirmations is controversial and beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 2. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament]; Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choos-
ing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking]. 
 3. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2.  
 4. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2.  
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import seems to be that Richard Posner should be the next Supreme 
Court appointment.5  
 While the tournament idea is intriguing, it is far too ambitious. In 
my view, a conscientious President probably would not choose Jus-
tices on the basis of such a tournament, partly because we cannot 
measure professional merit well enough and partly because profes-
sional merit is not the only factor that the President should find rele-
vant. Nevertheless, Choi and Gulati have made a valuable contribu-
tion by showing how objective measures of quality can improve the 
appointments process. Simply making the tournament data available 
on a regular basis through a reliable information source could help 
temper partisan claims and provide guidance for the public. More-
over, the data in their follow-up article raises tantalizing questions 
about the appellate process and, in particular, about the dynamics of 
judicial influence. Those questions would be well worth pursuing 
even if the results had nothing to tell us about how to appoint Jus-
tices.  
II.   INDICATORS OF JUDICIAL QUALITY 
 Supreme Court Justices engage in four major tasks: (1) they vote 
on which cases to accept, (2) they vote on the outcomes of cases, (3) 
they write majority opinions, and (4) they write dissents and concur-
rences.6 By contrast, federal appellate judges only engage in two of 
these tasks.7 Federal appellate judges rarely write separate opinions, 
so the fourth factor is less significant in assessing their performance. 
Also, nearly all appeals at the circuit level are mandatory, which 
makes the first factor less significant. This leaves two major tasks for 
federal circuit judges: voting on the merits and writing opinions. How 
well a judge performs these tasks on a lower court presumably has 
some predictive value about potential performance on the Supreme 
Court.8 Choi and Gulati attempt to measure circuit judges’ perform-
ance of these tasks along three dimensions: productivity, quality of 
opinion writing, and independence.9 Of these, as we will see, the at-
                                                                                                                     
 5. Id. at 74, 113 tbl.H. I know a number of academics who agree—including some 
who are liberals or skeptics about Posner’s specialty, law and economics—but I do not 
know of anyone who thinks the prospect is likely. 
 6. Justices also engage in other tasks, such as considering stay orders or approving 
changes in federal procedural rules, but these seem less central to the role. 
 7. The current norm is for Presidents to nominate circuit judges to the Supreme 
Court. Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for 
Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003); see also Choi & 
Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 40.  Whether this norm is desirable is outside 
the scope of this Essay.  
 8. How much predictive value is another question, which we will consider in Part IV, 
infra.   
 9. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 33, 42.  
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tempt to measure opinion quality via citation rates is probably the 
most successful. 
A.   Productivity 
 One of the stated purposes of the tournament is to encourage 
judges to work harder as they compete for higher rankings and Su-
preme Court nominations.10 One of the indices of judicial perform-
ance, consequently, is productivity. Since circuit judges have discre-
tion over which of their opinions are published, Choi and Gulati ar-
gue that judges with a higher number of published opinions are in-
vesting more time and effort in polishing opinions for publication. 
This is quite plausible, but there are alternative explanations for 
high publication rates that make these rates a weak indicator of ef-
fort. 
 One possible explanation for a high publication rate could be that 
a judge has trouble identifying which cases are important enough to 
serve as precedents and therefore deserve published opinions. Such 
an inability would be a handicap in a Supreme Court Justice. One of 
the Justice’s tasks is to decide which cases deserve Supreme Court 
review; thus a judge who cannot accurately gauge the significance of 
a case is at a disadvantage. 
 Another possible explanation is self-centeredness. Some judges 
may consider all of their output to be worthy of preservation for the 
ages, simply because it is theirs. A related explanation is that a judge 
may fail to appreciate the costs that publication imposes on others. 
The two other members of the panel must invest additional time in 
reviewing and commenting on a published opinion, and additional 
published opinions increase the size of the pool of authority that law-
yers must search. Productivity based on self-centeredness does not 
speak well of judicial quality or recommend promotion to the Su-
preme Court. 
 An alternative explanation for high publication rates is consistent 
with the idea that some judges invest more effort in perfecting their 
opinions for use as precedents. Judges may vary in how important 
they consider this function of opinions, and some judges may focus 
more heavily on their role as generators of precedents at the expense 
of their dispute settlement role. A published appellate opinion not 
only provides a precedent, it resolves a specific piece of litigation. It 
is important for the functioning of the legal system as a whole that 
appeals be correctly decided, which means not only that the correct 
rules of law are announced for the future but that the rules are rele-
vant and correctly applied to the specific case. This may take tedious 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 2, at 304. 
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investigation of the trial record. A judge who is willing to cut corners 
on fidelity to the record can publish more opinions, and those opin-
ions may be well regarded as precedent. Yet, that judge also de-
creases the ability of the legal system to respond accurately to the 
facts of cases and degrades the overall performance of the system 
(besides being unfair to individual litigants). Furthermore, individual 
cases themselves sometimes have substantial social importance 
(think of the Microsoft antitrust litigation or of redistricting chal-
lenges), so it is important for judges to invest time in scrutinizing the 
record even if doing so does not increase the opinion’s precedential 
value. 
 A final, and even simpler, explanation is that some judges need 
not invest a high level of effort in order to get a high publication 
count, either because they themselves are facile writers or because 
they are able to recruit and motivate highly productive law clerks. 
Being able to write easily, or successfully motivate clerks to do so, is 
a valuable trait. It is not, however, a gauge of effort. Moreover, 
judges are probably either good writers when they are appointed (or 
good supervisors) or they are not; either way, providing incentives is 
unlikely to make much difference. 
 The bottom line is that productivity may measure good judicial 
traits such as effort or writing ability or bad judicial traits such as 
self-centeredness or sloppy treatment of facts. Without knowing 
more, we cannot be sure of what we are measuring or whether it is 
something we want to encourage. 
B.   Citations as a Measure of Opinion Quality 
 Are citation counts, of any kind, a gauge of quality? In the context 
of appellate judges, it seems plausible to think so. For citations to be 
unrelated to quality, we would have to assume that judges are just as 
likely to cite and rely on muddled or ill-reasoned opinions as on co-
gent and logical ones. This would indicate a serious problem with the 
functioning of the federal judiciary. Presumably, judges tend to cite 
cases which best support their arguments or most require distin-
guishing or rebuttal. Consequently, they should favor strong opinions 
over weak ones in their citation practice. 
 Yet we should not expect citations to be a very precise measure of 
quality. Too many other factors may influence how often a judge’s 
opinions are cited: the “luck of the draw” (how many significant cases 
are drawn by panels on which that judge sits), the author’s reputa-
tion (which may imperfectly reflect actual quality), the quality of the 
judge’s law clerks in a particular year, ideological or personal affilia-
tions (or antipathies) between judges, and just plain luck (perhaps an 
opinion gets cited more often because its name is short and memora-
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ble or because the facts are striking).11 For these and other reasons, it 
seems right to say that “[c]itations are at best a crude and rough 
proxy for measuring influence.”12 In turn, influence may only imper-
fectly reflect quality. 
 Moreover, we may not want circuit judges to strive to maximize 
their citation rates. In seeking to increase their influence, judges 
may reach for broader holdings by ignoring the factual nuances of 
specific cases. Or in trying to write influential opinions, they may 
simply not pay much attention to the litigation record. They might 
also be likely to insert unnecessary dicta or to address issues not 
raised by the lawyers or addressed by the trial judge. None of these 
seem to be particularly beneficial behaviors. 
 Although these points suggest the need for caution in relying on 
citation counts, it remains true that citation counts tell us something 
important about how useful opinions are to other judges. A judge 
whose opinions are consistently useful to others is probably doing 
something right, while a judge whose opinions are rarely cited is 
probably performing badly. 
C.   Independence 
 “Knee-jerk” is not usually considered a good adjective as applied 
to judges. We presumably do not want judges who always vote for the 
most liberal or conservative result without considering specific legal 
arguments. It is probably even worse to have judges who always vote 
with members of the same political party without regard to the mer-
its of cases. Thus, Choi and Gulati are right to include independence 
as one of their measures, but their measurement of this characteris-
tic is problematic. 
 Choi and Gulati measure independence by counting disagree-
ments with other judges appointed by Presidents of the same politi-
cal party.13 This does not seem to be a particularly apt measure. A 
Republican-appointed judge who often votes on the opposite side 
from others may be more moderate, but equally well could be an ideo-
logical extremist who is parting company with less ideological col-
leagues. Moreover, since we are talking about relatively small num-
                                                                                                                     
 11. Also, the citation figures do not seem to measure quality for members of the D.C. 
Circuit, who tend to get fewer citations because their workload is specialized, centering on 
administrative law. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 40 n.30 (recog-
nizing that the different nature of the D.C. Circuit’s docket from that of the other circuits 
might make total citations a less meaningful comparison, but including D.C. Circuit judges 
in the tournament because other citation figures, such as citations to top twenty opinions 
and citations by law review, might be more meaningful). 
 12. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts 
of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998). 
 13. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 63.  
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bers of judges in each circuit, it is hard to control for other variables. 
Some judges may have been appointed by members of the same party 
but have sharp personality clashes with each other, or one may be 
markedly more competent than the other. This could lead to frequent 
disagreements but would not tell us much about whether a judge is 
voting on a purely ideological basis.  
 More fundamentally, independence is not a neutral concept. What 
one of us sees as an ideologue, another may see as a person of princi-
ple. Judges who vote on the basis of expediency rather than principle 
may disagree frequently with their more principled colleagues. Or to 
put it another way, one might view “independence” as a euphemism 
for “inconsistency” and hence as an undesirable trait. 
 Deciding how much weight to give to independence or how to 
measure it requires a normative judgment. Formalists and pragma-
tists may have different concepts of what kind of independence is re-
quired by judges. For the formalist, it is the ability to strictly follow a 
set of rules, regardless of pressure to reach a more congenial result. 
For the pragmatist, it is the ability to be open to opposing argu-
ments, consider the implications of a decision, and reach a balanced 
conclusion. These translate into very different conceptions of judicial 
independence. 
III.   PROBING THE MEASURES OF OPINION QUALITY 
 Of the three basic criteria discussed in Part II—productivity, opin-
ion quality, and independence—it is the second factor that seems 
most useful in assessing judicial performance. As we have seen, pro-
ductivity is an ambiguous quality, which might reflect either well or 
badly on judicial performance. Independence is normatively charged 
and hard to measure. Thus, the remainder of this Essay will focus 
primarily on opinion quality as the measure of judicial performance. 
Obviously, other highly desirable traits may not be captured by this 
measure. 
 Opinion quality is assessed through citation counts.14 Although ci-
tation counts do seem related to the quality of judicial opinions, vari-
ous different citation counts can be used and the data can be handled 
in different ways. We need to know more about the processes that 
generate this data before we can decide on the proper method of 
measurement. Choi and Gulati have assembled some extremely in-
teresting data, which provide a basis for a more detailed analysis. 
 This analysis is significant for reasons that go beyond the tour-
nament idea. Citation practices—which opinions are cited, by whom, 
and for what purpose—are a basic part of the legal system. But we 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See id. at 48-49.  
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know little about the processes involved. The data presented by Choi 
and Gulati help shed some light on these broader questions. 
A.   Power Laws and Normal Distributions 
 In trying to understand the process that produces citation rates, 
one of the most important clues is the shape of the statistical distri-
bution. Different kinds of processes characteristically produce differ-
ent sorts of distributions. For purposes of this Essay, we are primar-
ily interested in two types: the normal distribution and the power-
law distribution.  
 The best-known statistical distribution is the “bell curve,” or nor-
mal distribution, which is often associated with the idea of random 
variation.15 Bell curves are associated with a certain type of random 
process. According to a basic statistical law, “the sum of a large num-
ber of independent random variables will be approximately normally 
distributed almost regardless of their individual distributions.”16 
Thus, when many small factors combine to produce a result and each 
factor has an element of randomness, the result is likely to be a nor-
mal distribution. 
 In assessing how close a distribution comes to being normal, there 
are three useful parameters. The first involves the center of the dis-
tribution. For the normal curve, the median, the mean (what most 
people mean by the “average”), and the mode are identical. The sec-
ond parameter is skew, which measures asymmetry. A normal curve 
is symmetrical rather than being stretched in one direction. The 
skew parameter is zero for the normal distribution. A high skew 
means that a distribution is bunched on one side and stretched out 
on the other. The third parameter is called kurtosis. Kurtosis meas-
ures whether a curve is flattened out or unusually peaked, compared 
with the normal distribution. The normal distribution has a kurtosis 
of three.17 
 Apart from the normal curve, we are also interested in another 
type of distribution—the power-law distribution. Complex, nonlinear 
systems have a characteristic distribution of outcomes: a “high fre-
quenc[y] of small fluctuations, punctuated by the occasional large 
shift[] in system conditions.”18 Rather than following the familiar 
normal distribution, outcomes in complex systems often follow what 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See generally M.G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 108-15 (Dover ed. 1979) 
(1965). 
 16. Id. at 109. 
 17. See id. at 63-65. 
 18. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to 
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 
952 (1997). 
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are called power laws19—that is, the frequency of an event is often 
given by its magnitude taken to a fixed negative exponent.20  
 Some additional explanation of power laws may be helpful for the 
non-mathematically inclined. Albert-László Barabási, a physicist 
who studies complex networks, explains how power laws work. Con-
trasting power laws with the normal curve governing characteristics 
such as human heights, he points out that a frequency distribution 
“following a power law is a continuously decreasing curve, implying 
that many small events coexist with a few large events.”21 For exam-
ple, “[i]f the heights of an imaginary planet’s inhabitants followed a 
power law distribution, most creatures would be really short. But no-
body would be surprised to see occasionally a hundred-feet-tall mon-
ster walking down the street.”22 Such “outliers” are much less likely 
when a normal distribution is involved. Or, in more technical terms, 
“[b]ell curves have an exponentially decaying tail, which is a much 
faster decrease than that displayed by a power law.”23  
 Caselaw can be considered a network of cases linked by citations. 
Power laws seem characteristic of complicated networks. Some ex-
amples include the World Wide Web, where the number of links to a 
particular site follows a power law; the number of citations to a given 
physics paper; and even the number of other actors with whom a 
given Hollywood star has appeared.24 On the Web, for example, about 
ninety percent of a sample of two hundred million web pages are the 
targets of ten or less links, while about three pages had roughly a 
million other pages linking to them.25 Similarly, students of bibli-
ometrics refer to Lotka’s law, under which productivity follows an in-
verse-square relationship: if one hundred scholars in a group each 
publish one paper annually, then twenty-five will publish two, eleven 
will publish three, six will publish four, and so forth, with a single 
scholar producing ten papers.26 In other words, the number of schol-
ars who produce N articles per year is proportionate to 1/N2. As it 
turns out, Supreme Court opinions also appear to follow a power law 
in terms of their frequency of citation.27  
                                                                                                                     
 19. For an introduction to power laws, see MANFRED SCHROEDER, FRACTALS, CHAOS, 
POWER LAWS: MINUTES FROM AN INFINITE PARADISE 33-38, 103-19 (1991). 
 20. See RICARD SOLÉ & BRIAN GOODWIN, SIGNS OF LIFE: HOW COMPLEXITY PERVADES 
BIOLOGY 201 (2000). 
 21. ALBERT-LÁSZLÓ BARABÁSI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS 67 (2002). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 68 n.1. 
 24. Id. at 67-69. 
 25. Id. at 57-58. 
 26. See Virgil L.P. Blake, Citation Studies—The Missing Background, 12 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 1962 n.6 (1991) (book review) (citing Linus Ikpaahindi, An Overview of Bibli-
ometrics: Its Measurements, Laws and Their Applications, 35 LIBRI 163, 171 (1985)). 
 27. Daniel A. Farber, Earthquakes and Tremors in Statutory Interpretation: An Em-
pirical Study of the Dynamics of Interpretation,  89 MINN. L. REV. 848, 871-72 (2005). 
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 Several possible mechanisms might result in a power-law distri-
bution for judicial citations. One is the superstar phenomenon.28 
Suppose that judges differ in quality. The top judge’s opinions are 
slightly better than everyone else’s. So when that judge has written 
on an issue, her opinion is the one cited by other judges. When she 
has not written on an issue but the second-best judge has done so, 
the second-best judge’s opinion gets cited instead; and so forth. Small 
differences in quality can translate into large differences in rank-
ings—just as small differences in GPAs can translate into large dif-
ferences in class ranks. 
 We can get some sense of how the superstar phenomenon works 
with a simple model. Assume that the chances that a particular 
judge will get to write about a particular issue is 1/a (in other words, 
this is the probability that the judge will sit on the first case in the 
circuit raising that issue and be assigned to write the opinion). Thus, 
1/a is the proportion of issues that any particular judge can write 
precedential opinions about. In this simple model, once an issue has 
been decided in a given circuit, later opinions cite that as the disposi-
tive opinion in the circuit because it binds future panels; later judges 
in the circuits have no reason to do any more than cite that case. 
Then the best judge will write on 1/a of the issues, and those opin-
ions will be the exclusive citations when those issues arise, so that 
judge receives a 1/a share of the cites. The second-best judge has a 
1/a share of the remaining cites, or (1/a)(1 - 1/a). By the time we 
get to the “(n + 1) judge,” the number of remaining cases where no 
previous judge has written is (1 - 1/a)n, and so that judge gets cited 
in (1/a)(1 - 1/a)n of the cases. Note that the ratio between the “n 
judge” and the “(n + 1) judge” in terms of citations is constant: (1 - 
1/a). This is a power-law distribution.29 
 Note that in this model, the ranking of citations perfectly repli-
cates the ranking of quality, but the scale is distorted, since even a 
tiny difference in opinion quality means that the top judge will be 
cited in preference to the other judges in every case where the top 
judge has written.30 The superstar effect can also appear even if there 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 72.  
 29. A fuller model would introduce some complications. Certain judges may sit on cir-
cuits where more issues of first impression arise, which would increase their chances of 
hearing such cases. Similarly, by reason of seniority, some judges may be more likely to get 
assigned the interesting opinions. Also, if the number of novel issues is not proportionate 
to caseload, judges from smaller circuits might have an advantage because fewer judges 
would be splitting up the interesting cases. Conceivably, influential judges might some-
times be cited when they merely follow existing circuit precedent, rather than making new 
law. Finally, it probably is not true that a higher-ranking judge is always cited in prefer-
ence to a lower-ranking one, so we might need to add some random variation. 
 30. For a summary of various situations that can produce a superstar distribution, 
see Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar 
Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1181-89 (2002). 
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are no differences in quality between judges. If consumers tend to 
cite cases in proportion to their existing popularity, with only a small 
chance of citing something that has not been cited previously, the 
distribution of product types will tend to something called the Yule 
distribution, which is close to being an inverse-square power distri-
bution.31 
 Other processes might produce a normal distribution rather than 
a power-law distribution. The citation count for a given opinion 
might depend on a whole series of factors, each of which varies ran-
domly. For example, the list of factors might include: 
(1) The judge’s past experience with issues in the field. 
(2) The judge’s IQ. 
(3) How much time the judge can devote to the particular opinion,   
given other responsibilities. 
(4) The quality of the lawyers in the case (it is presumably easier to 
write a good opinion if the briefs are of high quality and the case 
has been well litigated). 
(5) Who else is on the panel and how many changes they demand. 
(6) Whether the opinion is well classified by the digest systems, and 
whether the judge used the right key words that will show up in 
a computer search. 
(7) Whether the opinion happens to be cited in the next few cases on 
the issue. 
 If we assume that each of these and similar factors has an ele-
ment of randomness, their combined effect is likely to look like a 
normal distribution. On the other hand, a power-law distribution 
suggests that some kind of feedback is at work. With these observa-
tions in mind, we consider the distributions of various measures of 
opinion quality. 
B.   Invocations 
 We begin with invocations, that is, with the number of times the 
judge is identified by name in later opinions as the author of a major-
                                                                                                                     
Gulati and Sanchez explain the extreme cases using the “pure talent explanation” (where 
outcomes simply reflect the enormously greater talent of certain individuals) and the “pure 
randomness explanation” (where an initial lucky success is “locked in” by a cascade effect). 
See id. at 1183-84. 
 31. See Kee H. Chung & Raymond A.K. Cox, A Stochastic Model of Superstardom: An 
Application of the Yule Distribution, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 771 (1994). The Yule distribu-
tion can be approximated by 1/[(N)(N + 1)], see id. at 773, which is bounded above by (and 
converges with) 1/N2. Thus the statement in the text that the Yule distribution is “close 
to” an inverse-square relationship. In another model, reputation effects and search costs 
can produce the superstar effect even if there are no quality differences. See Moshe Adler, 
Stardom and Talent, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 208 (1985). 
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ity opinion.32 As we will see, this distribution looks nothing at all like 
a bell curve. In fact, it is more extreme than one would expect from a 
power-law distribution. 
 Table 1 shows that something odd is going on with invocation 
rates. 
TABLE 1 
FREQUENCY OF INVOCATIONS33 
TOTAL INVOCATIONS NUMBER OF JUDGES 
0-9 88 
10-24 8 
25-49 0 
50-74 0 
75-99 0 
100-124 1 
125-149 0 
150-174 0 
175-199 1 
 
(Note that what would otherwise be the first row here (0-24) is split 
into two, in order to give a better sense of the shape of the distribu-
tion.) The distribution consists of two outliers (who are actually Pos-
ner and Easterbrook34) along with a large clump. The summary sta-
tistics confirm the oddness of this distribution: the kurtosis is a re-
markably high 54.7 (recall that the kurtosis of a normal curve is 
three).35 
 For purposes of comparison, imagine that the same table showed 
someone’s journal of food expenses. On most days the person lives 
frugally, spending less than $10 a day; on other days the person lives 
more expansively, spending up to $25. But on two days out of a hun-
dred, the person’s food expenses leap over $150. The obvious infer-
ence is that something special happened on those days: either the 
person splurged at a really fancy restaurant or invited a group of 
people to dinner. These were obviously not just days when the person 
                                                                                                                     
 32. For background on invocation rates, see David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The 
Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 371 (1999). 
 33. Table 1 was constructed by collating figures from Table F of Choi & Gulati, Em-
pirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 104-07. 
 34. Posner had 176 invocations and Easterbrook had 103 during the time span stud-
ied by Choi and Gulati. Id. 
 35. Id. at 107. 
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felt a little hungrier and ordered extra food. Similarly, something 
special seems to be happening with the invocation rates for Posner 
and Easterbrook. 
 One possibility is that Posner and Easterbrook are simply judges 
of an entirely different caliber than their fellows, like two NBA play-
ers who have wandered into a lawyers’ after-work basketball game. 
While they may well be exceptionally good judges, however, it seems 
unlikely that differences in ability level can account for the magni-
tude of the difference in invocation rates. The third-highest-ranking 
judge is Guido Calabresi, with twenty-three invocations.36 Posner and 
Easterbrook are undoubtedly very bright, but are they five times as 
bright as Calabresi, not to mention the other eminent judges on the 
list? 
 Another possibility is the superstar phenomenon—judges invoke 
only the very best names, given a choice, so a judge who is just a lit-
tle better than his fellows will get disproportionately more invoca-
tions. Without a good model of how reputations develop, it is hard to 
test this explanation. We can get some sense of its plausibility by as-
suming that a judge’s prestige tracks the number of legal issues on 
which a judge has written the leading opinion. Under the basic su-
perstar model, this is simply equal to the number of cases on which a 
judge is cited, since courts are presumed to cite only the leading 
(“best”) opinion. But the distribution of invocations does not fit with 
this explanation. The problem is that no matter how good Easter-
brook and Posner are, they first have to sit on a case where an issue 
is presented in order to write the leading opinions on that issue. 
There must be a great many legal issues that, for one reason or an-
other, have not been the subjects of opinions by Easterbrook or Pos-
ner: either they did not happen to be on a panel on which these is-
sues were raised or someone else wrote the opinion. In these other 
cases, the superstar phenomenon should lead to large numbers of ci-
tations of leading opinions by the third- or fourth-best judges on is-
sues that never reached Posner and Easterbrook. Hence these sec-
ond-tier judges should have written almost as many leading opinions 
as Posner and Easterbrook, and their invocation rates should not be 
drastically lower. But this is not what we see in the data.  
 Recall that, in the basic model, the superstar effect produces a 
constant ratio between citations as we move one rank in the ratings. 
But for invocations, the ratio between judges 1 and 2 is 103/176, or 
0.58; the ratio between judges 2 and 3 is 23/103, or 0.22; and the ra-
                                                                                                                     
 36. Id. at 104 tbl.F. 
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tio between judges 3 and 4 is 19/23, or 0.82.37 Moreover, the first two 
ratios are hard to account for on the basis of the superstar effect. 
Consider the 0.58 ratio between the first and second judges. In the 
basic superstar model,38 the ratio between judges who adjoin in the 
rank order is (1 - 1/a), and if we set this equal to 0.58, we get 1/a = 
0.42. (Remember that 1/a is the likelihood that a judge will write the 
controlling circuit opinion on the issue.) But this seems implausibly 
high—it would require that the top judge happen to sit on the panel 
(and get assigned the opinion) in 42% of the cases raising issues of 
first impression in the circuit.39 For similar reasons, the 0.22 ratio 
between judges 2 and 3 is even harder to square with the superstar 
model.40 
 Invocations reflect reputations rather than raw citation figures, 
but it is hard to see why the falloff between reputations should be so 
steep as we move from the judge who is considered to be the best in 
the country to the second-best and then to the third-best judge. We 
cannot exclude this possibility, however, without a better theory of 
how judicial quality is translated into reputations. 
 Another plausible possibility is that Easterbrook’s and Posner’s 
names are invoked for reasons other than general judicial reputation. 
Perhaps they are invoked in cases involving their special area of ex-
pertise: economic analysis.41 It would be entirely understandable that 
these two judges should be the dominant judicial figures on econom-
ics issues. 
                                                                                                                     
 37. The numbers used to calculate these ratios are the total invocations to the top 
four judges—Posner, Easterbrook, Calabresi, and Wilkinson, respectively—as reported by 
Choi and Gulati. Id. 
 38. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
 39. Consider a court comprised of N members. What are the odds that a given judge 
will not be on a panel? When we pick the first judge on the panel, the odds are (N - 1)/N of 
getting someone other than the specified judge. Now there are only (N - 1) judges left in the 
pool, so the odds of missing the specified judge the second time are (N - 2)/(N - 1). Simi-
larly, the odds of missing the specified judge a third time are (N - 3)/(N - 2). If we multiply 
these together and simplify, everything cancels out except (N - 3)/N, so the chances of 
missing the specified judge all three times is (1 - 3/N). Hence, the judge will be on 3/N of 
the panels. But Posner is from the Seventh Circuit, and we know that there were ten 
judges from that circuit in the tournament, see Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra 
note 2, at 41 tbl.1, and this does not include post-1998 appointments, senior judges, or 
judges sitting by designation, all of whom serve on panels. Even for N = 10, we would get 
only a 30% chance of serving on a particular panel, so it is unlikely that Posner would have 
the opportunity to sit on panels hearing 42% of the cases that raise issues of first impres-
sion. 
 40. With (1 - 1/a) equal to 0.22, 1/a = 0.78. Following up the reasoning of the previ-
ous footnote, this would require that the judge sit on 78% of the panels hearing issues of 
first impression. Even in a smaller circuit like the Seventh, any one judge sits on less than 
half this percentage of cases.  
 41. Calabresi is also a major figure in the law and economics movement, but his major 
work in this genre came earlier in his career and was focused on the specific field of torts. 
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 Economics issues are important in some Supreme Court cases, so 
Posner’s and Easterbrook’s expertise should count in their favor. But 
these cases may not be the most important part of the docket, and a 
President might be warranted in giving this factor relatively low 
weight. Unreflective use of statistics obscures this question. More 
generally, this analysis suggests the need for caution in using invoca-
tion figures as a measure of quality, because the figures may be 
skewed by extraneous factors. 
 As this discussion of invocation statistics shows, it is important to 
look beyond the raw data in assessing possible measures of judicial 
quality. While this is most obvious with the outlier cases in the invo-
cation statistics, it is also true of Choi and Gulati’s best indicator of 
opinion quality—outside circuit citations.42  
C.   Citations 
 Citations are a more promising gauge of opinion quality. There 
are, however, several possible measures of citation rates to consider. 
We begin with Choi and Gulati’s “top twenty” citation measure.43 In 
order to control for the effect of productivity on citation counts, Choi 
and Gulati identified each judge’s top twenty opinions (measured by 
citations) and then totaled the cites to those opinions. This measure 
focuses on the impact of the judge’s strongest opinions rather than 
looking at all opinions. 
 To get a sense of the distributions, it is helpful once again to start 
with a table. 
TABLE 2 
CITATIONS TO TOP TWENTY OPINIONS44 
OUTSIDE CITATIONS TO JUDGE’S TOP TWENTY OPINIONS NUMBER OF JUDGES 
0-100 2 
101-200 24 
201-300 39 
301-400 19 
401-500 9 
501-600 2 
601-700 2 
701-800 1 
 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 49-50.   
 43. See id. at 54, 100-03 tbl.E.  
 44. Figures collated from id. at 100-03 tbl.E. 
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There are a few things to notice about Table 2. First, unlike the fre-
quency of invocations in Table 1, there are no big gaps in the distri-
bution. While some entries are quite a bit higher than the mean, the 
numbers climb smoothly to the peak. Second, the distribution is a bit 
skewed.45 Third, it is roughly bell-shaped. These impressions are 
supported by the formal statistics, which show some skew but a kur-
tosis of close to three (which would characterize a normal distribu-
tion).46 
 Why is this a (roughly) normal curve rather than a power-law dis-
tribution? Power laws indicate nonlinearity. For example, we would 
expect a power law if a judge’s top twenty cases were in a feedback 
loop, where having some of them cited frequently leads to more cites 
for those cases or for the judge’s other top twenty cases. The absence 
of such a feedback loop (or at least, of any evidence of such a loop) 
suggests that among the most prominent cases, citations are not re-
inforcing but rather are based purely on the precedential value of 
each opinion. 
 We get a different picture in Table 3, where we look at total cita-
tions, rather than just citations to a judge’s twenty most-cited opin-
ions: 
TABLE 3 
TOTAL CITATIONS47 
TOTAL OUTSIDE CIRCUIT CITATIONS NUMBER OF JUDGES 
101-300 34 
301-500 34 
501-700 22 
701-900 4 
901-1100 2 
1101-1300 0 
1301-1500 2 
 
This does not look remotely like a bell-shaped distribution. Instead, 
it starts with a large number of judges who get only a few citations 
and tapers off, at first quickly and then more slowly. This is con-
firmed by the kurtosis, which is high (5.0)48 but not nearly so high as 
the kurtosis for the invocation statistics (which was about ten times 
                                                                                                                     
 45. If it were completely symmetrical, some judges would have to have a negative 
number of citations to balance some of the above-average judges. 
 46. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 103. 
 47. Figures are collated from id. at 94-98 tbl.D. 
 48. Id. at 99.  
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higher).49 This looks a great deal more like a power curve than a 
normal curve. This should not be surprising—power curves are typi-
cal of citation counts in a variety of different fields. 
 The most notable feature of the power curve is that it tapers off 
more slowly than a normal curve, so some people get much higher 
scores than a normal curve would produce. If we assume that the dis-
tributions of ability and effort are closer to the normal curve, some 
process must be boosting the top scores, magnifying differences of 
ability and effort into large differences in outcomes.50 
 Comparing the last two tables suggests that something of the kind 
is operating here. The quality of top twenty opinions, which pre-
sumably reflects the ability and effort of the judges fairly accurately, 
follows a normal distribution. But the overall number of citations 
does not, which indicates that for top judges, differences in citations 
for non-top twenty opinions are disproportionate to differences in 
ability and effort. In other words, there is a feedback loop for cita-
tions of less significant cases but not for citations of the most signifi-
cant ones. We could conjecture that significant opinions are cited 
purely on the basis of their quality, but that less significant opinions 
are cited partly because the judge who wrote them is well known. 
 We might also consider the figures for law review citations to 
judges in Table 4.  
TABLE 4 
LAW REVIEW CITATIONS51 
NUMBER OF LAW REVIEW CITATIONS NUMBER OF JUDGES 
0-199 14 
200-399 44 
400-599 29 
600-799 10 
800-999 0 
1000-1199 1 
 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Id. at 107. 
 50. This feature applies to a broader set of distributions than power curves. Curves 
having leptokurtosis have steeper peaks and fatter tails than the normal curve, but they 
have small shoulders—in other words, most cases are either near the average or spread 
out, with fewer intermediate cases than one would expect. Such distributions are said to be 
characteristic of situations involving actors with bounded rationality. See BRYAN D. JONES, 
POLITICS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE: BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND GOVERNANCE 
164-84 (2001). 
 51. Figures collated from Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 94-99 
tbl.D. 
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With the possible exception of the top judge (once again, Posner) who 
seems to be something of an outlier, this distribution does not show 
strong signs of a superstar effect. Unlike invocations of judges in 
other opinions, citations to judges in law reviews seem to be distrib-
uted among a broader group of judges, with little evidence of the su-
perstar phenomenon. This is all the more interesting because opin-
ions in casebooks show strong signs of the superstar phenomenon,52 
so law professors appear to use different criteria in deciding which 
cases to use in these two different settings. 
 Of the various citations figures, which is most relevant for consid-
ering potential Supreme Court appointments?53 The answer is proba-
bly the outside circuit citations to the judge’s top twenty opinions. 
The most important thing a Justice does is write majority opinions. 
Justices write fewer than twenty such opinions per year—more like 
ten these days. The tournament covers three years, so the “top 
twenty” count measures approximately the best seven opinions a 
judge can write in a year, which is pretty close to the Supreme Court 
workload. Citation figures for less significant cases tell less about 
Supreme Court performance. When you get down to the thirtieth 
least significant opinion a judge can write in a given year, some 
judges may be much better than others, but this is irrelevant since 
Supreme Court Justices never write that many majority opinions. In 
other words, what we care about is the quality of the work the judge 
does when he or she is really focused on a case and trying hard, not 
the quality of his or her work on less significant cases.54 
 Another reason to favor the “top twenty” index is that it is more or 
less a normal distribution, displaying few signs of the superstar phe-
nomenon or other effects that might amplify or distort differences be-
tween judges. Invocations are the worst index by this standard, but 
total citations also show more signs of nonlinear effects than top 
twenty citations. Law review citations also have some appeal in 
terms of the absence of apparent nonlinear distortions, provided we 
are willing to view citation decisions by academics as unbiased and 
accurate. 
 In the end, however, the choice of citation basis probably is not 
critical if we are only looking for a rough measure of opinion quality. 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 30. 
 53. Choi and Gulati also collect statistics on citations by the Supreme Court. The 
problem is that the numbers are small, ranging from 0 to 16, with almost all judges in a 
small range between 4 and 8. Thus, the numbers could represent mostly random variation. 
The only judges whose citation counts are listed as statistically significant (at the 95% 
level) are Posner, Easterbrook, and a group of judges who received zero citations. It would 
be interesting to examine the Posner/Easterbrook citations to get a better sense of when 
they are cited. See Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 2, at 94-99 tbl.D. 
 54. The judge who tops the list based on this standard is Sandra Lynch. Id. at 100 
tbl.E. Lynch replaced Stephen Breyer on the First Circuit. 
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As Choi and Gulati point out, the correlation between citation indices 
is very high after correcting for nonlinearities in some of the indi-
ces.55 But if we are looking to pick a winner in a tournament, the 
choice of index may be more important. 
IV.   THE RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
 Given what we can measure about past judicial performance, are 
these measurements relevant in evaluating possible Supreme Court 
nominees? Of the available measures, citation figures seem to be the 
best indication of professional performance for judges. But of course, 
they are only an imperfect measure. Indeed, among top judges, dif-
ferences between citation rates might not even be statistically sig-
nificant, so picking judges purely on the basis of numerical scores 
might not be sensible. 
 There is another reason why the President might give only limited 
weight to citation figures. I suggested earlier that the most relevant 
citation figures are probably the number of citations to a judge’s 
twenty most influential opinions. The reason is that this is compara-
ble to the number of majority opinions for a Supreme Court Justice 
in any given year. But the most heavily cited opinions by a given 
judge may not be a random sample of different legal issues.  
 Based on a recent study of citations to Supreme Court opinions,56 
it appears that the judicial opinions most heavily cited by other 
judges may tend to involve procedural and other technical issues.57 
For example, in the 1984 Term, the five opinions most cited by other 
courts involved procedural issues (three cases), ERISA, and an erro-
neous jury instruction on municipal liability.58 In contrast, law re-
views tend to favor citations to cases involving important social is-
sues. Consequently, only a weak correlation exists between law re-
view citations of Supreme Court cases and citations in law.59 
 This might suggest that the President ought to focus instead on 
law review citations as better measuring performance in cases in-
volving major social issues. The problem is that these citations ar-
guably may be less reliable as an indicator of quality. Academics do 
not have the same incentives that judges have to focus their citations 
on the strongest opinions. They may equally well cite all of the opin-
ions that bear on a particular topic, such as the legality of a specific 
form of abortion, or they may choose to write about the opinions with 
                                                                                                                     
 55. See id. at 74. They correct for nonlinearities such as the superstar effect by using 
the logarithm of citation counts rather than the raw counts. Id. at 72. 
 56. See Farber, supra note 27. 
 57. See id. at 870. 
 58. See id.  
 59. See id. at 871, 873. 
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which they most disagree. Moreover, the President might reasonably 
fear that the political views of law professors would influence their 
citation practices, which would make law review citations particu-
larly suspect if the President does not happen to share that political 
orientation. So the President might well find the “top twenty” cita-
tion rate to be a more reliable figure.  
 What this means is that most reliable citation figures probably 
best measure how well a judge does with technical legal problems. 
This is surely not an irrelevant consideration for a President. Pre-
sumably, it is in the country’s interest to have technical legal issues 
decided correctly and with the most useful possible guidance to the 
lower courts. But a President might reasonably be more concerned 
with how well a judge will handle cases involving major social issues 
such as abortion, affirmative action, or antiterrorism issues. Citation 
counts may not give a good indication of the quality of those opinions. 
 The President might take either of two views about how cases in-
volving major social issues relate to more technical legal cases. On 
the one hand, he might believe that cases involving major social is-
sues require only the same set of problem-solving and analytical 
skills involved in more technical cases. Even so, he might still have 
doubts about relying too heavily on the technical cases as gauges of 
performance in “hot” cases. He may be concerned about whether a 
judge who has very strong skills (as shown by citation levels) is able 
to exclude ideological factors in more political cases. Thus, he would 
want to look at those cases specifically to see if the judge is able to 
solve really contentious legal issues through a dispassionate applica-
tion of legal skills. 
 On the other hand, the President may believe that decisions in 
“hot” cases involve something more than the application of technical 
legal skills—that personal values or empathy or statesmanship are 
especially important in these cases. Citation rates in cases with more 
legalistic issues will only weakly reflect the presence of these val-
ues.60 Whichever view the President takes about the relationship be-
tween technical cases and “hot” cases, measuring the quality of opin-
ions in the more technical cases would give him only limited guid-
ance. 
 So far, I have been assuming that the President finds it irrelevant 
how the judge will vote on particular legal issues but is only looking 
for general indicators that a Justice will have the character and skill 
to make good decisions in hard cases. But it is not clear that a con-
                                                                                                                     
 60. This may be part of the explanation for why individuals with federal circuit ex-
perience have not historically tended to rank as “great” Justices, as observed by Steven 
Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1237 (2005). 
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scientious President should take that view.61 There are two reasons 
why the President might give weight to his view of how the Justice 
will vote on key issues. 
 First, if the President has sufficient faith in his own views of the 
constitutional merits of these issues, he might view a judge’s ability 
to reach the “right answers” to be a critical test of judicial ability and 
character. A judge who keeps getting the wrong answers must be do-
ing something wrong, even if the President does not feel confident of 
his ability to determine the exact nature of the deficiency.  
 Second, the President might view the outcomes in those cases as 
having a social significance that outweighs any question of technical 
legal correctness. He may believe that abortion is a form of mass 
murder or, alternatively, that access to abortion is critical in order 
for women to be equal citizens. It might be wrong for a judge to base 
a decision entirely on her views about such social and moral consid-
erations. But the President is not a judge and would seem to have 
the discretion to nominate the judge whom he thinks will be, all 
things considered, best for the nation’s welfare. 
 The point is simple: If the President simply wants to make the 
best possible appointment, general measures of professional compe-
tence are not likely to be the exclusive factor in the decision. There 
might, however, be some collateral reasons for excluding or at least 
minimizing other factors. 
 To begin with, the President might believe that introducing other 
factors undermines confidence in the courts by making them appear 
politicized. This is certainly a concern, and one that has been fre-
quently voiced. But nomination controversies do not seem to have 
harmed the courts’ reputation to date, perhaps because few people 
pay attention to the appointments process. 
 Alternatively, the President might believe that basing his selec-
tion on apparently objective measures will lead to a smoother ap-
pointments process, with less unseemly wrangling with Congress. 
This would surely be desirable. But it is another question whether it 
is realistic, given the country’s current political polarization. And in 
any event, the tournament might not be successful in reducing parti-
sanship. For instance, the putative winner of the tournament, Judge 
Posner, has taken controversial positions which would be offensive to 
important political factions. It seems unlikely that their opposition 
would be silenced by the strength of his professional credentials. 
 Or perhaps the President might believe, like Choi and Gulati, that 
using objective selection criteria would give lower court judges an in-
                                                                                                                     
 61. By conscientious, I mean a President who wants only to make the best appoint-
ment for the good of the country, excluding all partisan or personal considerations.   
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centive for high performance. Here, there are two questions. First, 
how strong would the incentive effect be? Only a few judges would be 
serious contenders for victory in the tournament, and the incentive 
effect would be strongest for them—but presumably the best per-
formers are least in need of additional incentives. Second, is the gain 
in incentives for lower court judges worth making an otherwise less 
desirable Supreme Court appointment? Looking at the welfare of the 
country as a whole, the President may think that small changes in 
the performance of lower court judges are not valuable enough to be 
worth the sacrifice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Choi and Gulati propose a tournament, whereby promotion to the 
Supreme Court would be based on objective measures of a circuit 
judge’s performance. Although it is intriguing, such a tournament is 
not, at least at present, a plausible option. Of the three traits that 
Choi and Gulati seek to measure, one (productivity) is ambiguous as 
an indicator of quality, and another (independence) is hard to meas-
ure and ideologically charged. Citation counts—and in particular, 
Choi and Gulati’s “top twenty” counts—provide a better metric. This 
measure of opinion quality is imperfect but seems relevant to the 
President’s selection. 
 Yet, even if overall judicial performance could be perfectly meas-
ured, the best lower court judge might not be the best choice for the 
President. Presidents are legitimately concerned with other factors, 
including how the nominee might vote on current key issues and how 
the nominee is likely to approach future national controversies. The 
tournament idea puts too much weight on one dimension, albeit an 
important one. 
 Although the tournament may not be “ready for prime time,” col-
lecting and disseminating data on circuit judge performance could be 
very useful. For example, a website could post the best available 
measures of judicial quality.62 If it established a reputation for objec-
tivity, such a website could be a valuable resource during Supreme 
Court vacancies. It would be up to the relevant actors—Presidents, 
Senators, press members, and the public—to decide on the relevance 
of the information. More complete information could well improve the 
quality of the debate. 
 Furthermore, such a website also could serve less dramatic, but 
still significant, secondary functions. It would allow law students to 
                                                                                                                     
 62. The model could be Brian Leiter’s influential website ranking law school faculties. 
See Brian Leiter, Ranking of Law Faculty Quality 2003-04, EDUCATIONAL QUALITY RANKINGS 
OF U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 2003-2004, at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/ 
(Mar. 25, 2003). 
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make better-informed decisions about clerkships. Even without the 
prize of a Supreme Court nomination, simply posting the measures 
could also create some useful incentive effects. Finally, the website 
would be a valuable resource for scholars. 
 It would be terrific to reform the acrimonious Supreme Court ap-
pointment process, but this may be too much for mere law professors 
to achieve. If Choi and Gulati manage to have only a small incre-
mental effect on judicial selection, that will be noteworthy. In the 
meantime, the data they have already collected will provide scholars 
with significant insights into patterns of influence among appellate 
judges. 
 
